分析：伯南克為何不該連任？

閱讀他最近向美國經濟學會(American Economic Association)發表的演講時，我起初懷疑這是場惡作劇。他在演講中為美聯儲在住宅泡沫期間的行動進行了辯護。他非但沒有承認，2002年至2006年間，自己和前任前任艾倫?格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)將過低的利率維持了太長時間，致使局面變得壹團糟，反而表示美聯儲的政策是合理的，住宅價格上漲的主要原因不是廉價的資金，而是松懈的監督。Searching in vain for a punch line, I was reminded of Talleyrand's quip about the restored Bourbon monarchs: They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Mr Bernanke is far smarter than Louis XVIII and Charles X, two notorious boneheads, and has done a good job of firefighting. But his unwillingness to admit the Fed's role in inflating the housing and broader credit bubble raises serious questions about his judgment.我試圖找出笑話中的點睛之筆，卻沒有結果，讓我想起塔列朗(Talleyrand)對復辟的波旁王朝君主的嘲諷：他們什麽都沒有學會，也什麽都沒忘記。伯南克比路易十八(Louis XVIII)和查理十世(Charles X)這兩個臭名昭著的傻瓜要聰明得多，而且救火工作也做得不錯。但他不願承認美聯儲在催生房市泡沫和更廣泛的信貸泡沫中所扮演的角色，令人對他的判斷力產生了嚴重質疑。The individual elements of his presentation were questionable enough ? is it really plausible to suggest that record low mortgage rates did not contribute much to the rise in US house prices but most disturbing was its failure to address the larger picture: from the mid-1990s, the Fed adopted a stance that encouraged irresponsible risk-taking. In periods of growth, it raised interest rates slowly, if at all, stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the course of asset prices. But when a recession or financial blow-up beckoned, it slashed rates and acted as a lender of last resort.他演講中的個體因素就夠令人質疑的了難道認為創紀錄低水平的抵押貸款利率對於推高美國房價沒有多大貢獻，這種觀點真的看似有理嗎？但最令人不安的是，演講未能從大處著眼：從上世紀90年代中期開始，美聯儲采取了壹種助長不負責任的冒險行為的立場。在經濟增長期，美聯儲固執地拒絕承認資產價格的變化軌跡，即便提高利率，速度也相當緩慢。但在經濟衰退或金融危機向其招手的時候，美聯儲便大幅下調利率，並擔當起最終借款人的角色。On Wall Street, this asymmetric approach came to be known as the Greenspan put. It gave financial institutions the confidence to raise their speculative bets, using borrowed cash to do it. None of the Fed's actions since then have addressed this central issue of moral hazard. Indeed, the problem may have become worse. For all the damage that the financial industry has inflicted on itself, when disaster arrived the Greenspan/Bernanke put did pay off. By slashing the funds rate and providing emergency credit facilities to stricken financial firms, the Fed further entrenched the perception that its ultimate role is to provide a safety net for Wall Street.在華爾街，這種不對稱的措施如今被稱作格林斯潘對策(Greenspan put)。它讓金融機構得以放心地利用借來的資金提高投機性賭註。美聯儲後來的任何行動都未能解決這個道德風險的核心問題。事實上，問題可能已變得更糟。盡管金融業給自己造成了傷害，但當災難來臨時，格林斯潘/伯南克對策確實發揮了作用。通過大幅削減聯邦基金利率、向受災的金融機構提供緊急信貸安排，美聯儲進壹步確立了壹種理念，即它的終極角色是為華爾街提供安全保障。Unlike his predecessor, Mr Bernanke recognises the problem of excessive speculation and the massive externalities its sudden reversal can impose. In that sense, intellectual progress has been made. But he and his deputy, Donald Kohn, still refuse to acknowledge the Fed's role in motivating reckless behaviour.與前任不同，伯南克承認過度投機問題及其突然逆轉可能造成的嚴重外部性。從這個意義上來說，他取得了知性方面的進步。但他和他的副手唐納德?科恩(Donald Kohn)仍然拒絕承認，美聯儲促動了不計後果的行為。?6?5Take its current commitment to maintaining rock bottom rates for an extended period. Hedge funds and Wall Street dealing desks view this as an open invitation to borrow as much as they can and invest it in risky assets. As former Citigroup chief executive Chuck Prince might have put it, the music is playing, and it is time to dance. (The danger of being left without a chair when the music stops is greatly mitigated by the Fed's promise to provide ample warning of it unplugging the sound system.) ?6?5以其目前在較長時期內保持最低利率水平的承諾為例。對沖基金和華爾街投行的自營交易部門認為，這是在公開邀請它們盡可能借款，並投資於高風險資產。花旗集團(Citigroup)前首席執行官查克?普林斯(Chuck Prince)可能會說：音樂已經響起，跳舞的時間到了。（美聯儲承諾在拔掉音響系統插頭前會提供充分警告，極大地緩和了當音樂終止時找不到座位的風險。）Mr Bernanke and Mr Kohn remain opposed to using interest rate rises to burst bubbles in their early stages. Mr Bernanke says this task should fall on a new systemic risk council of senior regulators. You do not have to be a devotee of Milton Friedman to wonder where these super-regulators will be found ? surely not at the Fed, which botched its supervision of mortgage lenders and bank holding companies.伯南克和科恩依然反對在早期階段利用加息來戳破泡沫。伯南克稱，這項任務應當由高級監管官員組成的新系統風險委員會承擔。即便不是米爾頓?弗裏德曼(Milton Friedman)的信徒，妳也會想知道這些超級監管官員將從何而來當然不會來自美聯儲，它在監管抵押貸款放貸機構和銀行控股公司方面表現得壹團糟。But the problem goes deeper than one of hiring. When credit is artificially cheap and asset prices are rising, banks have enormous incentives to circumvent capital requirements. In such circumstances, even the smartest regulators will struggle to contain a dangerous rise in leverage.但問題遠比從哪裏雇人要深刻得多。當信貸成本被人為壓低，資產價格不斷上升時，銀行有巨大的動機繞過資本金規定。在這種情況下，即便是最精明的監管者也會很難遏制杠桿率的危險上升。In seeking to separate decisions about interest rates from issues of financial stability, Mr Bernanke is returning to the wishful thinking of the Greenspan era. In a financially driven economy, it takes vigorous oversight and a responsible monetary policy to prevent bubbles. Before the next boom gets under way, the Fed needs a credible commitment to limiting leverage and raising interest rates and doing what is necessary to shock people out of cloud-cuckoo land. The last thing we need is a return to the misguided policies that got us into this mess. Until Mr Bernanke pledges a decisive break with Mr Greenspan's legacy, his confirmation for another four years should be put on hold.為了將利率決定與金融穩定問題區別開來，伯南克重新打起了格林斯潘時代的如意算盤。在壹個受金融業推動的經濟體中，防止泡沫形成需要強有力的監管和負責任的貨幣政策。在下壹個繁榮時期開啟之前，美聯儲需要做出可靠的承諾：限制杠桿率、提高利率、並采取必要行動將人們從烏托邦的幻境中驚醒。我們最不需要的就是再次采用導致我們陷入這場混亂的錯誤政策。在伯南克發誓與格林斯潘的傳統決裂之前，應該暫緩批準他連任四年。John Cassidy is author of How Markets Fail and a staff writer at the New Yorker